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China introduces new
Export Tax Rebate
policy
Background
Like other WTO members, China has
adopted a tax rebate system since 1985 to
expand exports and increase the
competitiveness of exporting enterprises
in the international market. The export
rebate rate averaged some 15 per cent in
the past, and funds needed for export
rebates were all financed by the Central
Government. In recent years, however,
with the rapid growth of China’s exports,
government revenues have failed to keep
up with tax rebates due to export
enterprises. Outstanding export VAT
refund claims have increased from US$10
billion in 1999 to over US$30 billion at
the end of 2003, with an annual increase
of 36 per cent. On the other hand,
however, the average annual increase in
the Central Government’s fiscal revenue
is only about 20 per cent. As public
finance of the Central Government
cannot cover all funds needed for export
rebates on a timely basis, there has been
default in payment of refunds since 2000.
The delayed payment of tax rebates has
created fiscal pressure on the Chinese
Government and affected the normal
operation of export-oriented enterprises,
as many companies faced the problem of
insufficient working capital resulting
from the delays in receipt of tax rebates.
Recent revision to export tax
refund rates
To alleviate long-outstanding export refund
claims and reduce the heavy burden on
State finance, the Ministry of Finance and
the State Administration of Taxation
recently issued an official document
(Caishui [2003] No. 222) that represents a
structural change to the VAT export refund
policy of China. The tax refund rates have
been changed from four to five rates, with
an overall average reduction of
3 percentage points. The table on the next
page provides different adjustments for
various types of exported goods with effect
from 1 January 2004.
Impact of the rate cuts on
business operation
The cuts in the tax refund rate are in line
with State policies to support exports of
certain goods and restrict others. For
example, the refund rate has been
increased from 5 per cent to 13 per cent
for enterprises producing certain
agricultural and poultry products for
export. On the other hand, in terms of
exports that China does not promote,
such as crude oil, the Government has
reduced the tax rebate rate by a large
margin or even abolished refunds.
Although the annual growth rate of
exports for some industries may be
affected because of the dropped tax
refund rate, China’s overall exports are
unlikely to be significantly affected since
exports are still more profitable than
domestic sales.
However, lowering the tax rebate rate
may create some negative impact on
export-oriented enterprises. First, it
reduces the rate of return on products
that companies sell overseas. For
example, if a company imports raw
materials worth US$100 and sells the
product at a price of US$140 with the
gross profit of US$20. When the refund
rate drops one percentage point, the
gross profit rate of the product will drop
from 14.3 per cent to 13.3 per cent
according to the VAT rate of 17 per cent.
In general, those enterprises that export
most of the production with small profit
margin will suffer the most from the
reduced refund rate. Moreover, the tax
rebate rate cut weakens export
enterprises’ competitiveness in the
international market because of the extra
cost of sales created. However, in the long
run, it is expected that the relatively low
labour cost in China will set off the
additional VAT costs created and enable
Chinese export products to remain
competitive in the international market.
Though the reduced tax refund rate
increases the costs of exported products,
it is expected that the expedited payment
of the tax rebate under the new policy
will improve the cash flows of export
enterprises and save them some
operating costs. The Central Government
guarantees that increases in central
import duties will first be used to pay tax
rebates, and thus, no new debt is likely in
the future. Local governments will share,
on a 25 per cent:75 per cent basis, fiscal
burdens with the Central Government in
this regard. The central government also
guarantees payments of old debts with
interest. However, the Government has
not set a timetable by which all old debts
owed thus far will be settled.
Some observations
The new policy provides only a temporary
solution to ease the heavy burden on
State finance. To completely solve the
problem of export rebates, China needs
to restructure the current tax system. In
developed economies, government’s
financial revenues usually come from
income tax, complemented by turnover
tax. The reverse is true in China where
fiscal revenue comes primarily from
turnover tax. In China, VAT takes up a
major share in turnover tax and accounts
for about 45 per cent of the Central
Government’s financial income. Since
export tax rebates cover VAT, which
constitutes a major proportion of the
government’s financial revenue, the zero-
rated treatment and VAT rebates for
export products actually removes a
While the recent export tax rebate rate cut in China creates
extra VAT costs that may weaken the competitiveness of export
companies in the international market, it also improves firm
liquidity position resulting from a timely settlement of tax
rebates in arrears.
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Agricultural products with a current VAT export refund rate of 5%
(e.g., soybeans)
Agricultural products with a current VAT export refund rate of 13%
(e.g., cotton); Industrial products processed with agricultural products as
raw materials with VAT export refund rate at 13%; Goods with an export
refund rate of 13% (excluding goods with refund rate to be revoked or
reduced as mentioned below)
Goods with the current refund rate of 17% (e.g., ships, automobiles and
spare parts, aviation vessels, numerically controlled machine-tools,
multifunctional machine-tools, unit construction machines, printed circuits,
program controlled telephones, telegraphic switching apparatus, light-
transmitting equipment, medical instruments and appliances, metallurgy
equipment, rail locomotives, etc.)
Wheat and maize flour, meat and edible offal of ducks, rabbits or
hares, etc.
Products derived from natural resources: coke and semi-coke of coal,
bituminous coal, light-burned and dead-burned (sintered) magnesia,
feldspar, talc, steatite, etc.
Products derived from natural resources: unwrought aluminum, yellow
phosphorus and other phosphorus, unwrought nickel, molybdenum ores
and concentrates, etc.
Petroleum; unwrought zinc; coal and chemical fertilizers, etc.
Certain electronic machinery; clothes and textiles etc.; certain iron or steel
articles, small hardware, organic or inorganic chemical materials, plastic-
ware, toys, shoes, clocks and watches, ceramics and porcelain, fiber,
rubber-ware, sports products, leather craft, travel utilities and luggage,
etc.
Products derived from natural resources: crude oil, timber, wood, paper
pulp, goat wool, eel fry, ore of rare earth metals, phosphorus ores, natural
graphite, etc.
Exported Goods VAT Refund Rate
Before (1/1/2004) After (1/1/2004) Change
5% 5% 0%
13% 13% 0%
17% 17% 0%
5% 13% +8%
13%, 15%, 17% 5% -8% ~ -12%
13%, 15% 8% -5% ~ -7%
13%, 15%, 17% 11% -2% ~ -6%
15%, 17% 13% -2% ~ -4%
5%, 13%, 0% -5% ~ -17%
15%, 17%
sizable proportion of the central public
finance. Therefore, China should
restructure the existing tax system to let
income tax take over turnover tax as the
principal component in its tax structure.
This will minimise the impact on the
Government’s revenue of tax rebates due
to fast growing exports.
In addition, to alleviate the financial
burden on the Government in refunding
VAT to exporters, the tax authorities
should take a stricter stance with regard
to the levying of VAT and the
enforcement of administrative measures.
There are some loopholes in the current
administration of export rebates in the
country. Though VAT is shared by public
finance of the central and local
governments, VAT rebates were entirely
borne by the central public finance in
the past. Given this institutional
arrangement, local governments may not
have adequate incentives to verify
whether certain tax rebates are justified
and whether tax rebates are given to
qualified taxpayers. Moreover, despite a
normal rate of 17%, ‘autonomous’
preferential policy by local governments
is offered in many areas, and thus many
enterprises do not pay the standard 17%
VAT for products sold overseas. Finally,
the tax authorities should aggressively
attack tax evasion and tax rebate fraud. It
is estimated that the amount of turnover
tax actually collected accounts for only
about 15% of the total amount payable.
Tax evasion imposes great pressure on
State finance.
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